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ARTICLES
Evaluating the Social Effects of Environmental
Leadership Programs
by Jonathan C. Borck, Cary Coglianese, and Jennifer Nash
Editors’Summary: In the past decade, EPA and over 20 states have created voluntary environmental leadership programs designed to recognize and reward
businesses that take steps that go beyond compliance with the strictures of environmental law. Environmental leadership programs seek not only to spur direct
improvements to environment quality but also to advance broader social goals
that may lead indirectly to environmental improvements, such as improving businessgovernment relationships and changing business culture. Measuring progress
toward leadership programs’social goals is a particularly challenging but essential task if researchers and decisionmakers are to understand the full impacts of these programs. In this Article, Jonathan C. Borck, Cary Coglianese,
and Jennifer Nash present strategies for overcoming the three core challenges
in evaluating the social effects of leadership programs and any voluntary environmental initiative: (1) defining appropriate measures of social goals; (2) inferring whether programs achieve those goals; and (3) linking social effects to
environmental outcomes. Only through careful attention to these three empirical issues will it be possible to rule out alternative explanations and determine
whether environmental leadership programs are truly generating their intended positive social effects as well as improvements to the environment.

O

ver the past decade, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and more than 20 states have established environmental leadership programs (ELPs), a type
of voluntary environmental program with the explicit goal
of improving the environmental performance of privatesector facilities.1 EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track, considered by many to be the nation’s flagship
ELP, now boasts more than 500 member facilities that have
voluntarily implemented environmental management systems and set goals for their environmental performance that
Jonathan Borck is an associate with the Analysis Group, Inc., Boston,
Massachusetts. Cary Coglianese is the Edward B. Shils Professor of Law
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Jennifer Nash is the director of the Regulatory Policy Program at the
Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The authors thank
participants in the workshop, “Performance-Based Environmental Programs: Better Ways to Measure and Communicate Results,” sponsored by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Multi-State
Working Group on Environmental Performance, and the Environmental
Council of the States, and held at the Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, on March 11-12, 2008. We also received insightful comments from Angela Helman and Eric Ruder. Although the research described in this Article has been funded in part by
EPA contract EP-W-05-047, it has not been subject to the Agency’s review
and therefore does not necessarily reflect the views of the Agency. No official endorsement should be inferred.
1. Jonathan C. Borck et al., Environmental Leadership Programs: Toward an Empirical Assessment of Their Performance, Ecology
L.Q. (forthcoming).

go beyond meeting legal requirements. Similar state programs include the Partnership for a Sustainable Georgia,
Tennessee’s Pollution Prevention Partnership, and Virginia’s Environmental Excellence Program.
As a condition for the recognition and rewards that come
with membership in ELPs, facilities must submit application materials to the government demonstrating that they
meet specified entry criteria. As part of their applications,
facilities show that they have implemented systematic management practices and are committed to improving their environmental performance in areas such as water and energy
conservation and habitat protection. Many programs also
require businesses to establish community outreach programs as a condition for membership, and nearly all programs require facilities to inform the public on a regular basis about the environmental impacts of their operations.2
Although ELPs primarily seek to promote better environmental performance by industry,3 they also have been designed to advance a variety of social goals, such as improv2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Environmental Council of the States (ECOS),
Survey of State Support for Performance-Based Environmental Programs and Recommendations for Improved Effectiveness 1, 4 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/
downloads/ECOS_Report_Final_01-13-05.pdf (“The fundamental
goal of Performance Track and other state innovations programs is to
achieve better environmental results.”).
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ing relationships between businesses, communities, and
government agencies, and diffusing a more responsible
ethos throughout corporate culture.4 In creating its Performance Track program, for example, EPA aspired to “transform” its relationships with industry, making them more
“collaborative, cooperative, and focused on results.”5 Performance Track seeks to do so by moving beyond the traditional wielding of negative sanctions against rule-breakers,
and instead by having EPA recognize and reward businesses
that engage in responsible environmental conduct.6 In addition, by requiring that Performance Track members engage
in community outreach, EPA hopes to spur increased confidence and trust by local organizations and citizens in their
business neighbors.7 EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson
has declared that Performance Track’s positive approach is
“fundamentally strengthening the relationship between
business and government.”8
State governments have similarly established environmental leadership programs with social goals in mind. The
Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) has declared
that these programs can help “foster greater collaboration
between environmental regulatory agencies and high-performing companies.”9 At two recent workshops about
ELPs organized by EPA, ECOS, and the Multi-State
Working Group on Environmental Performance (MSWG),
participants spoke extensively about the importance of improving relationships, enhancing trust, and changing culture.10 In interviews we conducted with state ELP manag4. See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, The New Environmental Regulation 206 (2006) (stating that “a principal justification for . . .
beyond-compliance programs like EPA’s Performance Track” is
“to build a foundation for increased trust among the actors in the
regulatory system”). For a discussion of how environmental management systems—a core requirement for membership in almost
any ELP—can promote social goals, see William R. Moomaw,
Expanding the Concept of Environmental Management Systems
to Meet Multiple Social Goals, in Regulating From the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems Achieve
Policy Goals? 126-45 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds.,
2001).
5. U.S. EPA, Building on the Foundation: Performance Track
Second Annual Progress Report 3 (2004), available at http://
www.epa.gov/perftrac/PT_2nd_progress_rpt_FINAL.pdf. See also
U.S. EPA, Building Trust With Performance, available at
http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/members/downloads/PTwaterincentives_
reducedmonitoringpaper.pdf (noting that Performance Track “was
designed in part to foster greater cooperation between regulated facilities and their state and federal regulators”).
6. See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Performance Track Places Trust in the
Carrot Over the Stick, 10 Envtl. Quality Mgmt. 9 (2001).
7. As an employee of a Performance Track member has asserted, the
program “establishes a climate of respect and trust with the community. It keeps the people who live near you comfortable that you are
not polluting.” U.S. EPA, Leading Change: Performance
Track Fourth Annual Progress Report 22 (2006), available
at http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/downloads/PT_4th_Progress_Report.
pdf.
8. U.S. EPA, Performance Track Celebrates Five Years of Environmental Leadership, http://www.epa.gov/perfrac/5thAnniversary.
htm (quoting Administrator Johnson).

ers, officials voiced support for the goals of improving relationships and changing the culture of businesses and
government agencies.11
Businesses also give priority to ELPs’ social goals. According to membership surveys that EPA conducted in 2004
and 2006, participants in Performance Track reported that
social effects provide much of the value they receive from
participation. In response to the 2004 survey, for example,
members reported that their most important reason for joining and staying in the program was to enjoy a “collaborative/amicable relationship with EPA [and s]tates.”12 The
2006 survey showed that most respondents believed that
Performance Track participation had contributed to a “culture of continuous environmental improvement” and had
improved their facilities’ “relationship with EPA.”13 Of
course, the primacy that ELP members place on social goals
should not be surprising, given that ELPs are voluntary programs. Businesses that choose to join are those willing to
reach out to the government and those that find beneficial
the opportunities the programs afford for engaging with representatives of agencies and community organizations.14
In bringing facility managers, community residents, environmental advocacy organizations, and government environmental agencies into closer contact through meetings
and other mechanisms for information sharing, ELPs
clearly aim to transform traditional adversarial relationships
into more cooperative modes of interacting. The implications of such a shift, if achieved, could be substantial, as new
perspectives and best practices could begin to permeate facility walls and transform both business and government
agencies.15 It is also conceivable, though, that ELPs could
negatively affect relationships and the regulatory culture.
This could happen if ELPs raise expectations for cooperation that are not met, or if repeated interactions provide
greater opportunities for disagreement or miscommunication, with the possible unintended result of increasing levels of mistrust among stakeholders. Especially if agencies
promise benefits to participants that they fail to deliver, or if
facilities fail to live up to the commitments they make, relationships could be damaged rather than strengthened. It is
also conceivable that most programs’ commitments not to
subject members to routine regulatory inspections could
raise public suspicions and exacerbate public mistrust of
both agencies and facilities. For example, when EPA moved
to bolster benefits for Performance Track participants in
2005, environmental groups complained that the Agency

11.
12.
13.
14.

9. ECOS, supra note 3, at 7.
10. Angela Vituli & Eric Ruder, Summary of the May 8th Dialogue on
Performance-Based Environmental Programs (2007) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the authors); Hetal Jain, MSWG’s “International Dialogue on Ecological Policy”: Notes on Dialogue on Defining, Measuring, and Communicating Results of PerformanceBased Programs (2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Eric Ruder, State and Federal Performance-Based Environmental Programs: Assessing the Potential for Evaluation—State-
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15.

ment of Research Questions and Program Goals (2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
Borck et al., supra note 1.
Abt Associates Inc., Results of 2004 Performance Track Customer
Satisfaction Survey, http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/members/
news/mar05/survey_report.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
U.S. EPA, 2006 Performance Track Survey: Supplemental
Questions, Preliminary Results (2006).
See Jennifer A. Howard-Grenville et al., Constructing the License to
Operate: Internal Factors and Their Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions, 30 Law & Pol’y 73 (2008) (reporting evidence that participants in Performance Track are more extroverted
than non-participants).
Andrew A. King, The Role of Management Systems in Stakeholder
Partnerships, in Leveraging the Private Sector: Management-Based Strategies for Improving Environmental Performance 228-45 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006);
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation:
Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1995).
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was improperly trading away needed regulations and enforcement authority to induce facilities to join.16
The possibility that ELPs could either succeed or fail to
improve regulatory relationships and culture motivates the
question we address in this Article: How can agencies (or
anyone) measure and evaluate ELPs’ social contributions?
Agencies have put a great deal of work into developing environmental performance metrics for ELPs, collecting environmental performance data from member facilities and
compiling data into summary reports purporting to show
these programs’ direct contributions to environmental protection.17 Much less attention has focused on establishing
social impact measures and collecting social performance
data.18 Therefore, this Article outlines what would be
needed to demonstrate with confidence that ELPs achieve
their social goals successfully. While we focus on the social
goals of improving relationships and regulatory culture, the
basic issues we raise apply equally to evaluating the contributions of these programs to achieving any other goal,
whether it be achieving traditional environmental improvements, integrating environmental concerns into business
decisionmaking, or realizing other policy objectives.
I. Measurement Issues: Defining and Operationalizing
Social Goals
An initial hurdle in evaluating ELPs’ progress toward social
goals is to clarify what is meant by a “social goal” and develop appropriate performance measures. While environmental goals are themselves not always easy to define, for
the most part they are based on the consequences of economic inputs and can be operationalized using outputs that
can be isolated, measured, and tracked, such as emissions or
energy usage. But what, exactly, does it mean to “improve
relationships” among facilities, agencies, and surrounding
communities? Or to “change culture” or “enhance trust”?
Investigators cannot directly observe these phenomena—no “culture-o-meter” or “trust-o-meter” exists. In
these cases, investigators must identify proxy variables
that are correlated or associated with the underlying social
variables of concern.
Proxy variables can fall into one of two categories: (1) revealed proxies; and (2) expressed proxies. Revealed proxies
are measures of actual observable behavior consistent with
the underlying social variables of concern. Revealed proxies are closely related to the concept of revealed preferences
in economics: they are measures of real-world behavior that
reflect the preferences and attitudes of the actors.19 Examples of revealed proxies for improving relationships might
be the number of complaints community residents make to
or about an industrial facility or the number of lawsuits filed
by groups against polluters.
16. Letter from John Walke, National Resources Defense Council, to
U.S. EPA Docket ID OA-2005-0003 (Nov. 3, 2005); Letter from Eric
Schaeffer et al., President, Environmental Integrity Project, to Stephen Johnson, EPA Administrator (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/pubs/performance_track_
letter_jan06.pdf.
17. Borck et al., supra note 1.
18. Id.
19. Charles Kolstad, Environmental Economics 297 (2000);
U.S. EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economics Analyses §7.5,
http://yosemite1.epa.gov/ee/epa/eermfile.nsf/vwAN/EE-0228C-07.
pdf/$File/EE-0228C-07.pdf.
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In contrast, expressed proxies are measures of actors’
stated opinions. Expressed proxies are closely related to the
concept of stated preferences in economics: they are measures of actors’ preferences determined by their words, not
their actions. An example of a stated proxy for improving
relationships might be the responses to a survey question
asking environmental or community organizations how
much they trust industry or government regulators.20
The problems with revealed proxies are that they are limited in availability and may be more closely related to factors other than the underlying variable of concern. The
range of observable behavior is naturally limited. Businesses, regulators, and environmental and community
groups engage in only a few observable actions plausibly related to an underlying social effect. And when they do, these
actions are necessarily indirect measures of the underlying
social variables of concern. Investigators must be aware of
the possibility that the variation in a specific revealed proxy
is related less to the underlying social effect than to some
other factor or influence. For example, the number of lawsuits filed by environmental groups against polluters could
be explained more (or entirely) by changes in groups’ finances than by changes in underlying levels of trust or improvements in relationships. Investigators do not need to
abandon such revealed proxies. Rather, they can use statistical techniques to account for these alternative explanations.
But the issue certainly complicates efforts to identify the effects of ELPs.
Unlike revealed proxies, which are indirect and limited in
availability, expressed proxies are readily obtainable and
can be quite direct: investigators can ask directly about any
underlying social variable of concern. But they simply cannot be sure that the responses they receive are accurate reflections of the true feelings or views of the respondents.
Opinions obtained through surveys or interviews are prone
to numerous biases that have been well documented in various literatures.21 For example, respondents can be swayed
by the range of options in survey questions or by the first option provided in an interview. Respondents might respond
strategically to a survey question to influence a perceived
outcome. Respondents can also be influenced by the amount
and nature of background information provided in a survey
or interview or by external factors, such as the weather on
the day they answer the survey or conduct the interview, that
are entirely irrelevant to the questions being asked. Researchers are actively developing methods to elicit more
truthful (or less biased) responses to survey or interview
questions, and techniques have improved immensely from
the earliest days of survey research.22 But implementing
these improved methods to collect expressed proxies is both
time-consuming and expensive.
Another, more fundamental challenge with both revealed
and expressed proxies is that being that they are proxies, the
20. Kolstad, supra note 19, at 356-64; U.S. EPA, supra note 19.
21. Cary Coglianese, Is Satisfaction Success?: Evaluating Public Participation in Regulatory Policymaking, in The Promise and Performance of Environmental Conflict Resolution 69-86
(Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham eds., 2003); Tom Tietenberg, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
38-40 (7th ed. 2006).
22. Kolstad, supra note 19, at 356-64; Tietenberg, supra note 21, at
38-40; Paul Portney, The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists Should Care, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1994, at 3.
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direction of any correlation between the proxy and the underlying variable of concern can be unclear. Is the proxy
negatively or positively correlated with the underlying variable? For example, an improved relationship might mean
one with less conflict, perhaps measured by the number of
complaints community residents make to or about an industrial facility. Or an improved relationship might mean one
with more interaction, in which case an increase in the number of complaints might signal first steps in developing relationships that will eventually overcome the problems or
misperceptions that underlie the complaints. Similarly, researchers might measure the quality of communication by
counting the number of hours facility managers spend in
meetings with agencies and other stakeholders. But then
again, lengthy meetings could also indicate that facility and
agency managers have reached an impasse and are no longer
listening to each other. Finally, trust might be shown
through managers’ willingness to disclose large quantities
of information about their environmental performance to
community residents. On the other hand, being on the receiving end of a large “data dump” could feel like bombardment and perhaps only reinforce feelings of mistrust. In each
of these cases, investigators can observe plausible proxies
for the underlying social variables of concern, but it may
not always be clear whether changes in the level of the
proxy indicate improvement or deterioration in the underlying social goal.
The desire to understand whether an ELP leads to some
improvement gives rise to an added measurement challenge—namely, that the proxies gathered to assess progress
toward social goals should be collected not only from or
about participants in the ELP but also from an appropriate
sample of non-participants.23 Some revealed or expressed
proxies may be readily obtainable from businesses, regulators, and environmental and community groups both within
and outside a program. For example, investigators can presumably obtain a count of the number of lawsuits filed by
community or environmental groups against polluters,
whether or not the groups and polluters are involved in the
ELP. On the other hand, some proxies may be more difficult
to obtain from non-participants. For example, managers of
facilities participating in an ELP might readily respond to a
program-sponsored survey asking them about trust in government regulators because of its obvious relevance, but
non-participating facilities may be less likely to respond to a
request to complete such a survey. Obtaining data from both
types of facilities, however, is essential to draw proper inferences about any program’s impact.
II. Inference Issues: Determining the True Effects of
an ELP
Determining how well an ELP achieves its goals involves
more than just measuring progress toward the goals, even
if appropriate proxy measures can be identified and collected. Investigators must use techniques to assess whether
any progress they observe is actually the result of the program itself, or whether some other factor explains the results. They should be particularly aware of two confounding effects: (1) the “Hawthorne effect”; and (2) omitted
variables bias.
23. James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, Introduction to Econometrics §13 (2d ed. 2007).

10-2008

The Hawthorne effect draws its name from a study of
worker productivity conducted in the early part of the 20th
century at the Western Electric Company’s facility in Hawthorne, Illinois.24 The effect refers to the potential for study
subjects to act or respond differently just because they know
they are being studied. In the Hawthorne experiments, researchers varied working conditions (such as lighting,
schedules, and so forth) in an effort to determine how these
conditions affected worker productivity. They found that
over time, the productivity of the experimental group always increased—regardless of the changes made to workplace conditions.25 The Hawthorne effect reminds researchers that the very fact that members of a treatment group
know they are part of an experiment and are being observed
may influence how they perform or respond. The potential
for the Hawthorne effect is undoubtedly inherent in any voluntary program like ELPs. Researchers need to be mindful
of the possibility that any effects that appear to have come
from participating in the program under study may simply
have come about because participating facilities knew they
were in a program and were being observed.
The problem of omitted variables bias occurs when one or
more factors left out of an analysis—usually because it is
difficult or impossible to observe them—have an important
effect on the observed responses or outcomes.26 In such
cases, the risk is that the effect of an omitted variable will be
incorrectly ascribed to the variable measured and included
in the analysis. For example, when investigators analyze the
effects of participating in an ELP on some proxy for trust of
stakeholders, they may leave one or more important variables out of their analysis, perhaps inadvertently, but more
likely because it is difficult to gather data on all the variables
that might influence the proxy. One such variable could be
the degree of top-level management support for environmental activities. Not only might a facility’s degree of toplevel management support influence its level of trust of
other stakeholders as measured after it joined an ELP, but
top-level management might also influence whether a facility joins an ELP in the first place.27 If this support is not accounted for in a study of the social effects of ELPs, any
higher level of trust observed among participants could appear to have been caused by participation in the ELP itself
when, in fact, some (if not all) of the difference was due to
the preexisting degree of top-level management support for
the environment among participants. An analysis of trust
will not reveal the true effect of participation in the program
if the omitted variable is never taken into account.
One way to attack the omitted variables bias problem and
isolate the true effect of an ELP is to find a suitable proxy
variable for the omitted variable. These proxies are slightly
24. Id.; F.J. Roethlisberger & William J. Dickson, Management
and the Worker (1939).
25. Roethlisberger & Dickson, supra note 24.
26. Stock & Watson, supra note 23, §6; Jeffrey M. Wooldridge,
Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach §3.4 (2d
ed. 2003).
27. Other research, in fact, shows that the degree of top-level management support is strongly associated with participation in voluntary
environmental programs. See Jonathan C. Borck et al., Why Do They
Join? An Exploration of Business Participation in Voluntary Environmental Programs, in Beyond Compliance: Business Decision Making and the U.S. EPA’s Performance Track Program (Regulatory Policy Program Report No. RPP-10, 2006).
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different from the proxies discussed in the section above.
There, we discussed types of proxies for the underlying social effect of interest or the outcome of concern. Here, we
seek proxies for unobservable variables that influence the
outcome of concern. But the ideas and the challenges are the
same in both cases. For example, a proxy variable for the
omitted variable of facilities’ preexisting levels of top-level
management support could take the form of responses to
survey questions that had been administered before the ELP
was established. Under certain statistical conditions, this
proxy variable can be used to control for the unobserved
variable and help isolate the true effect of the ELP.28
Another way to tackle the omitted variables bias problem
in a statistical setting is the so-called instrumental variables
technique.29 Unlike a proxy variable, which is a variable
correlated with the unobservable omitted variable, an instrumental variable is a variable correlated with participation in the ELP. Under certain conditions, the instrumental
variable technique can be used to isolate the true effect of the
program.30 The method of instrumental variables is well
known but challenging to implement, as it requires some
known randomness in at least one factor affecting the voluntary decision to participate in a program like an ELP.31
A more straightforward way to address the omitted variables bias problem is to use the “differences-in-differences”
method. Differences-in-differences is one of a class of statistical approaches that use data collected over multiple
time periods.32 The differences-in-differences technique
requires investigators to collect data on participants and
non-participants in a program in two time periods: (1) before the program; and (2) after the program. The method
assumes that participants would change over time the same
way the non-participants did if they never joined the program. If so, then any additional change in the outcome variable or effect of concern among the participants can be inferred to have been due to the influence of the program itself.33 For example, suppose that investigators observed
that the reported level of trust among a sample of managers from participating facilities increased by a certain
amount after the facilities joined an ELP. Moreover, suppose the investigators observed that trust also increased
among a sample of facilities that did not participate in the
program over the same time period. The differencesin-differences technique identifies the effect of the ELP as
the additional increase in trust among participants, not the
total increase in trust.34 The method provides not only a
better estimate of the effect of the program but also a more
28. Wooldridge, supra note 26, §9.2.
29. Stock & Watson, supra note 23, §12; Wooldridge, supra note
26, §15.
30. Stock & Watson, supra note 23, §12; Wooldridge, supra note
26, §15.
31. Lori Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Measuring Progress: Program
Evaluation of Environmental Policies, Environment, Mar. 2005,
at 22.
32. Wooldridge, supra note 26, §13; Stock & Watson, supra note
23, §13.
33. Cary Coglianese & Lori Bennear, Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies: Toward Evidence-Based Decision Making, in Decision Making for the Environment: Social and Behavioral
Science Research Priorities (Gary D. Brewer & Paul C. Stern
eds., 2005).
34. Id.
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confident one. It helps to rule out alternative explanations,
such as a preexisting but unobservable levels or propensities
to trust.
Note that all the statistical techniques described above require gathering data about facilities or other actors that are
not involved in a program. These non-participants serve as
the control group; that is, they provide a basis for estimating
what participants would have done in the absence of the program (the “counterfactual”).35 Without a properly chosen
sample of non-participants against which to compare the behavior and evolution of participants, investigators cannot
confidently estimate how much progress an ELP is making
toward its goals—social or otherwise.
The data needs are even more extensive to implement the
powerful differences-in-differences technique. Investigators must collect relevant data from: (1) the participants before they joined the program; (2) the participants after they
joined the program; (3) a sample of non-participants before
the participants joined the program; and (4) a sample of
non-participants after the participants joined the program.
Investigators who only collect data from participants in an
ELP after they have joined the program have only collected
one of the four chunks of data required to implement the differences-in-differences approach and thereby gain a best estimate of the true effect of the ELP.
Of course, in mentioning these statistical techniques, we
do not mean to imply that the social effects of ELPs can only
be studied through large samples using advanced quantitative analytic tools. Important insights can also be obtained
through in-depth study of smaller numbers of facilities or
programs. Yet, the challenges we have discussed about measurement and inference still arise. Fortunately, qualitative or
small-sample research can also be designed in ways that respond effectively to these challenges.36
III. Linking Social Effects to Environmental
Performance
Up to this point, we have been primarily concerned with social effects or outcomes themselves, as if these effects are
intrinsically valuable. Perhaps they are, in that people may
be happier to live and work in communities in which relationships among stakeholders are strong and cultures within
businesses and government agencies are cooperative. However, there seems to be good reason to suppose that many
policymakers and managers quite properly view social effects as simply a means to the larger end of improved environmental protection. After all, most agencies implementing ELPs are environmental protection agencies, not social
capital-building agencies.
If social effects are important primarily because of their
subsequent effects on environmental quality, for example,
because firms that garner greater trust tend to be the ones
that take greater strides to improve their environmental performance, then identifying and obtaining good measures of
and inferences about social effects will not be enough. In addition to the measurement and inference challenges we have
already discussed, researchers and policy analysts will also
35. Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002
U. Ill. L. Rev. 1111-37.
36. Gary King et al., Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (1994).
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confront challenges in determining the association between
social effects and environmental outcomes. Some of these
challenges will be familiar. For example, to determine if any
observed changes in social effects lead to changes in environmental outcomes, researchers will face measurement
challenges, such as the need to identify and collect measures
not only of social effects but also environmental outcomes.
Unfortunately, not all environmental outcomes are regularly
or reliably measured. Thus, investigators must use those
measures that are available, such as EPA’s toxic release inventory (TRI), as proxies for overall environmental performance. As with all proxies, investigators must be aware that
the proxies may not be highly correlated with the underlying
outcome of concern, in this case overall environmental performance. Reported TRI figures, for example, may provide
at best only a partial indicator of facilities’ aggregate levels
of pollution and their overall environmental performance,
especially when that performance is understood to include
energy and water use, among other things.37
Familiar issues of inference also complicate the linking of
social outcomes to overall environmental performance. As
is true for any research issue, correlation is not the same as
causation.38 Just because investigators observe that facilities with greater levels of various social indicators or variables also have superior environmental performance does
not mean that the increase in levels of social indicators or
variables led to the superior environmental performance.
For one thing, superior environmental performance might
be what leads to increases in levels of social variables, not
the other way around. Cleaner firms may prompt, and generate for themselves, greater trust. Furthermore, an unobserved third variable—the familiar “omitted variable” described above—may be responsible for observed effects
in both the social and environmental variables. In other
words, there may be something else—perhaps effective
managerial leadership—that promotes both greater trust
and improved environmental performance. Researchers and
policy decisionmakers must be particularly careful to consider, and try to rule out, alternative explanations and causal
pathways before crediting improvements in multi-stakeholder relationships, increases in trust, or changes in organizational culture with any observed improvements in environmental performance.
37. For a discussion of the strengths and limitations of TRI data, see
James T. Hamilton, Regulation Through Revelation: The
Origin, Politics, and Impacts of the Toxic Release Inventory Program (2005) and Lori S. Bennear, Strategic Response to
Regulatory Thresholds: Evidence From the Massachusetts Toxics
Use Reduction Act (June 27, 2005) (unpublished working paper),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=776504.
38. Wooldridge, supra note 26, §1.4.
39. See Coglianese, supra note 21; Bennear & Coglianese, supra note
31; and Lawrence B. Mohr, Impact Analysis for Program
Evaluation (2d ed. 1995).
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IV. Conclusion: A Path Forward
Evaluating the effects of any public program—not just
ELPs—requires attention to the kind of issues we have discussed in this Article.39 These issues also arise no matter
what the goals of the program may be. For this reason, no
one interested in ELPs should think that the challenges in
evaluating these programs will necessarily be any easier
when the goals are defined in social rather than environmental terms. Any well-executed and meaningful evaluation of
ELPs—whether for their impact on social or environmental
goals—will need to attend to these concerns. In other words,
it will never suffice simply to poll program members to see
if they are satisfied with the program or if they think it is
having social or environmental effects.40 These effects need
to be demonstrated through careful empirical research that
attends to the issues we have outlined here.
Even though such research can be a daunting task, it is not
impossible. Our discussion of evaluation challenges suggests ways to design evaluations that will yield convincing
results. For example, investigators should first take care to
identify plausible proxies for the underlying social effects of
concern. Identifying and collecting multiple proxies for a
single social effect or outcome can increase the level of confidence that the proxies are measuring the right effect, especially when the direction of correlation between a single
proxy variable and the underlying social effect or outcome
is unclear.
If investigators are primarily interested in social effects as
a means to improvements in environmental performance,
they should take care to link the social effect to environmental performance explicitly. To improve the confidence in
making inferences about the effects of ELPs, investigators
should be sure to collect data both from participants in the
program and an appropriate sample of non-participants.
Since some of the most powerful inference techniques require data from before the participants joined the program,
investigators may wish to focus evaluations on industrial
sectors or groups of facilities that have not yet joined a particular program and follow them as they join. Taking these
evaluation issues into account before establishing new
ELPs could provide opportunities for collecting pre-program data that can be used to compare to post-program outcomes or responses.
Overall, investigators must be aware of and transparent
about alternative explanations for any correlations they observe. Only by addressing the issues we have outlined in this
Article can researchers and regulatory officials rule out alternative explanations for their results and thereby increase
confidence in what they can conclude about ELPs’ success
in achieving their goals—social or otherwise.
40. Coglianese, supra note 21.

